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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



Scientific and Technical Intelligence--General

Director of Central Intelligence
CIA Building
Washington 25, D. C.

1. References:

- a. USIB-D-34.4/3, dated 6 August 1962.
- b. USIB-M-299, dated 15 August 1962. (Item 8).
- c. D.C.I. Memorandum, subject as above, dated 27 August 1962.

2. The USAF has an in-being active technical intelligence program organized and operated in consonance with the concepts and principles projected in USIB-D-34.4/3. The foreign technology activities of the USAF are fully integrated into the research and development operations of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) and the Office of Aerospace Research so that all USAF technological resources may be applied to the increasingly important and complex aerospace and technical intelligence task.

3. Under consideration within the Air Staff is a proposed five year plan for expansion and improvement of the USAF foreign technology capability. Portions of this proposed plan, if implemented, would enhance the Air Force capability to implement the USIB recommendations contained in USIB-D-34.4/3. It would be inappropriate to include a consideration of the proposed plan in our present response because the proposed plan does not represent an approved Air Staff action.


4. With the approval of the DIA Technical Intelligence Plan, review of Service scientific and technical intelligence activities will be vested in the Defense Intelligence Agency. For the USAF to include specifics of a plan projected five years into the future prior to submission of the plan to DIA for review would be improper even if Air Staff coordination were completed.

5. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Air Force response to your letter cannot furnish specific manpower and budgetary costs.

6. With respect to recommendations contained in paragraph 3 of reference a, the following are USAF actions which would be taken under the conditions set forth in paragraph 3. These actions are keyed to specific paragraphs in Attachment B, USIB-D-34.4/3.

DIA and USAF review(s) completed.

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a. Par 2 (a). The goal of the USAF is attainment of an operational Machine Language Translation Facility. Proposed programs are aimed at achieving this capability.

b. Par 2 (b). ACS/I, USAF will participate as requested to the extent possible within manpower and fund limits.

c. Par 2 (c). Same as 2 (b) above.

d. Par 2 (d). Any USAF action would depend on the outcome of the CIA/DIA review and recommendations.

e. Par 2 (e). Any USAF action would depend on CIA findings.

f. Par 2 (f). ACS/I cannot reply to this recommendation as implementation would involve non-intelligence resources.

g. Par 2 (g). No action is contemplated pending outcome of review.

h. Par 2 (h). Plans of the ACS/I, USAF for new technical collection methods will be coordinated with USIB as appropriate.

i. Par 2 (i). No USAF action is possible pending establishment of procedures.

j. Par 2 (j). No Air Force action.

k. Par 2 (k). Approval of the DIA plan for scientific and technical intelligence will provide for implementation.

l. Par 2 (l). No Air Force action.

7. With respect to paragraph 4, reference 1 c, the Air Force has no other measures to submit at this time.

8. This letter responds only to your memorandum of 27 August 1962 and does not constitute Air Force concurrence in USIB D-344/3.

9. This letter is classified Secret because it reveals details of USIB and AF documents or classified.



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Executive Registry

102-6937

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SUBJECT: Scientific and Technical Intelligence - General

TO: Assistant for Coordination, Director of Central Intelligence

1. Reference is made to your letter, subject as above, dated 27 August 1962.
2. The information requested in paragraph 3 of referenced letter is furnished in attachment 1.
3. Other measures deemed appropriate, as requested in paragraph 4 of referenced letter, are contained in attachment 2 of this letter. Relative to these measures, DIA is aware that the Military Services are also furnishing recommended measures for improvement of S&T intelligence in reply to letters similar to reference, paragraph 1 above. Such recommendations requiring program changes are subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense after review by DIA in its DoD intelligence coordination role.
4. A DIA study group, underway for the past month, will examine in depth the DoD S&T problem and the results are expected to be available in December of this year. The findings of this study group will supplement the measures outlined in attachment 2, and should develop a more detailed response to the FIAB report for improvement of S&T intelligence activities as pertain to DoD.
5. Transmittal of the information you have requested does not constitute a DIA concurrence in USIB-D-34.4/3. It is therefore requested that the document as modified by the Coordinating Staff be circulated to the USIB membership for subsequent formal consideration in USIB.

William W. Quinn

- 2 Atch
1. Specific DIA actions and costs
 2. Additional measures recommended

WILLIAM W. QUINN
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

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Specific actions of DIA and costs to implement measures recommended in Attachment B, USIB-D-34.4/3.

2(a) (1) Action:

At the present time, the Secretary of Defense has under study the entire DoD effort to develop a machine translation capability. Determination of the specific measures to be taken must await completion of this study. An accelerated effort should be the objective.

(2) Costs:

Determination of dollar and manpower costs must await decision as to the specific nature of the proposals to be undertaken as a result of the study.

2(b) Costs in dollars and manpower dependent on the nature of specific proposals resulting from studies initiated to meet this recommendation.

2(c) Same as 2(b) above.

2(d) Same as 2(b) above.

2(e) Same as 2(b) above.

2(f) Same as 2(b) above.

2(g) Same as 2(b) above.

2(h) (1) Action:

DIA in its role of DoD coordinator for intelligence activities will submit those plans, projects and progress which require USIB comment due to national and interdepartmental interests.

(2) Costs:

No deviation from DIA programmed activities required.

2(i) (1) Action:

The DIA action recommended is a part of the DIA Technical Intelligence Plan now being reviewed by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Costs:

The exact magnitude of the increase in manpower and costs is currently being resolved at the highest Defense levels. Dependent upon

Attachment 1

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the action of the Secretary of Defense, the annual cost of the DIA program may be expected to range between \$250,000 and \$500,000.

2(j) (1) Action:

DIA is prepared jointly to re-examine as recommended the activities for the production of S&T intelligence in the light of changes taking place in the intelligence community.

(2) Costs:

No deviation from DIA program objectives is required.

2(k) Action and costs same as 2(i) above.

2(l) Same as 2(b) above.

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Other Measures Appropriate in USIB Response to the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

1. USIB Agencies should jointly review the need for improved guidance to field collection units. Recognizing that Scientific and Technical Intelligence collection programs of wide variety and yet great similarity exist among the military services and other U. S. Agencies a prime requisite is to define areas in which S&T guidance should be supplied. This review should determine the actions required to effect a fully coordinated, dynamic and timely field collection guidance program. Both the review and the resulting program should be possible within existing assets and without extra cost; improvement will stem from emphasis and more effective procedures, not from additional expenditures.
2. USIB Agencies should jointly undertake a study to develop an even more aggressive recruitment and defection effort targeted on Sino Soviet Bloc personnel engaged in or knowledgeable of scientific and technical activities. Recruitment, defection and exploitation of these scientists and technicians should be an interagency effort of paramount priority using all available assets, in both U. S. Governmental and civilian organizations, to fulfill the objectives of this program. Such a study may be conducted without cost as a normal function of existing planning staffs; an assessment of the cost of the resultant program is dependent upon its nature and scope.
3. Action continues in improving the acquisition and exploitation of Soviet Bloc materiel. The Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program (FMEP) has been consolidated within the DIA Office of Acquisition pursuant to paragraph B 1 n, 3rd Note to Holders, JCS 2031/196. FMEP programs of the military services and CIA have been coordinated through DIA, the backlog of work has been eliminated and a DIA FMEP Manual is in preparation. An outline of a guidance publication concerning FMEP and Scientific and Technical Intelligence collection is being prepared. Additionally, realignment of the Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program is under study to improve the effectiveness of requirements, collection and exploitation. This effort is contained within the limits of existing resources; there is no extra specific or definable cost associated with it.
4. The Coordination Staff, in its assessment, noted that "DoD is currently examining the allocation of resources to the various military commands." DIA has an obligation and mission to maintain a complete inventory of intelligence collection assets available to serve the needs of DoD. An all-DoD source inventory is being compiled which will permit expeditious choice of action agencies and assignment of intelligence requirements, coupled with close monitoring and evaluation actions. This procedure will undoubtedly result in more effective coordination and validation of requirements, as well as minimize duplicative DoD collection efforts. To avoid duplication with collection efforts outside the DoD, DIA must have the cooperation of all agencies who possess collection assets with a military

Attachment 2

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potential. The compilation of this source inventory utilized existing resources of manpower and funds without additional, clearly definable costs.

5. DIA, in cooperation with the military services, should review existing and planned DoD programs for the exploitation of domestic scientific and technical literature. The objective of this review should be a coordinated and aggressive program to discover domestic scientific advances of potential military value for which evidence of corresponding Soviet research or progress can be sought; to discover evidences of the author's scientific cooperation with or useful knowledge of Soviet research in similar scientific disciplines; and to systematically review domestic scientific and technical achievements for discoveries or techniques of potential use as technical methods of intelligence collection. This review can be accomplished within available resources without additional cost; pricing of the resultant program must, of necessity, await a determination of its nature and scope.

6. In discharging the DoD function of collection scientific and technical intelligence pertinent to Department of Defense missions (para 3, NSCID 2), DIA, in conjunction with the military services, should review existing programs for the foreign intelligence exploitation of DoD contractor organizations and study methods for improving the coordination and productivity of such sources. The revised program for domestic exploitation of DoD contractors will be coordinated with CIA (para 1.e., DCID 2/3) and, if necessary, blanket authority for the exploitation by DoD component of DoD contractor agencies as a special category will be sought under para. 1.j., DCID 2/3. Where a DoD contractor agency is an existing domestic source of the CIA, direct contact by DoD component representatives will be requested under para 1.h., DCID 2/3. This review and study can be accomplished without additional cost within the resources of existing agencies. The cost of the ensuing program must await its delineation.

7. There is available to the intelligence community a considerable and relatively untapped wealth of scientific competence within the various statutory or ad hoc boards and committees of the Defense establishment. To the total U. S. technical intelligence effort, the opinions, ideas, and ingenuity of these scientists should be of priority importance. They represent a close tie with the Defense development effort, which is a principal consumer and raison d'etre for technical intelligence. DIA, in consultation with the Services, should undertake a study designed to catalog these resources of scientific talent and to establish a systematic and exhaustive system of securing their input, through DIA, to the overall USIB Scientific and Technical Intelligence program. The study and ensuing exploitation may be conducted within the normal functions of existing resources, without specific extra costs in men or funds.

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